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Vegans who do not eat roadkill are immoral. Consider 
that the most common rationale for veganism is avoiding 
unnecessary harm to animals.1 It is a well-known fact that 
animals are killed in the cultivation of plant foods such as wheat, 
corn and soybeans. Mice, rabbits and other field creatures are 
routinely run over by tractors or cut in two by harvesters. To 
buy commercial plant food therefore is to sustain the system 
responsible for these deaths. Road-killed animals, by contrast, 
are already dead, so the decision to consume them does not 
perpetuate a lethal process. A diet that consists entirely of 
plant food therefore will be responsible for a greater number 
of animal fatalities than a mostly-plant diet that also includes 
roadkill but no other meat. 
So goes the argument of Donald Bruckner’s cheeky paper, 
“Strict Vegetarianism is Immoral,” a standout chapter of The 
Moral Complexities of Eating Meat. Anyone who follows the 
animal ethics literature will be familiar with defences of meat 
eating premised on a rejection of animal rights. Bruckner’s 
ingenious argument by contrast is premised on animals having 
rights. This captures something of the collection in general, 
which offers original moves and thought-provoking conclusions 
with impressive frequency.
Moral Complexities has three sections. Parts I and II 
respectively defend and challenge the ethics of meat-eating. 
Part III, New Directions, contains papers that mostly endorse 
meat-free diets, but address questions such as whether 
1  I take it for granted that readers of Between The Species are familiar 
with the central arguments for animal rights and so do not repeat 
them here. For an example of such an argument that rules out killing 
animals for food, even painlessly, see McMahan (2003). For a more 
concise statement of this view see McMahan (2008).
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veganism should be regarded as an aspiration or a lifestyle, or 
why vegetarianism often assumes a quasi-religious status for its 
practitioners, to their own detriment. The result is a collection 
with greater thematic unity than most anthologies that offers a 
cutting-edge discussion of central issues. 
Defending Meat. None of the papers that defend omnivorism 
endorse factory farming. This reflects the current animal ethics 
debate, in which pro-factory farming views are increasingly 
a minority view. Thus Christopher Belshaw dismisses factory 
farming as “indefensible” in his opening defence of meat-
eating (12). Belshaw instead argues that death is not bad for 
most animals in any way that matters. His premise is that 
in order for death to be bad in a relevant way, the animal in 
question must want to continue living, and most animals are 
incapable of forming such a desire. 
Belshaw does not deny the controversial implications of 
this view for human beings incapable of desiring their own 
continued existence. “It is not bad, in the relevant sense, 
for babies to die.” (14) This is not the only counter-intuitive 
implication of Belshaw’s account. If an animal is incapable of 
wanting to go on living, he argues, then it is not capable of 
looking ahead to a future that contains stretches of good life as 
well as suffering, and concluding that the positive experience 
will outweigh the bad. Given this, it is better that the animal 
die now, so as to avoid the one thing that does matter, suffering. 
“Even if there are many years of good life ahead, still it is not 
worth an animal’s suffering a day’s agony in order for it to live 
that life.” (16) This view opens the door to killing animals for 
food insofar as they have no interest in continued existence. 
Painlessly killing them will not only be permissible, but in 
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many cases a net good for the animals, as it will prevent future 
suffering.
J. Baird Callicott defends meat-eating on communitarian 
grounds. We are simultaneously members of multiple 
communities—“familial, municipal, national, global, mixed, 
biotic”—and the obligations they generate can come in conflict 
(61). Callicott argues that one such obligation we have is to the 
environment or biotic community as such. Strictly speaking, 
this includes an obligation to end industrial agriculture, in 
order to restore agricultural land to a wild state and reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions from livestock. So in Callicott’s 
ideal world, meat-eating would consist of occasionally 
consuming venison or other game. The obligation to bring 
this about however is collective, and “at planetary scales, the 
impact of one’s personal and voluntary abstinence from meat 
is negligible.” (62) Callicott thus invokes a version of the so-
called inefficacy objection—our attempts to bring about 
systemic change through individual actions are futile—to deny 
any personal obligation to dismantle industrial agriculture. So 
long as the meat we eat is not factory farmed, our here-and-
now obligations to animals will be met. 
Callicott allows that veganism may have some symbolic 
value, but on his communitarian account, “hewing to one’s 
vegan virtue [can occur] at the cost of violating one’s social 
duties” (62). Callicott illustrates this with an anecdote about 
an academic dinner party at which the hosts, although not 
vegan themselves, took the trouble to cook vegan. Two vegan 
graduate students however “sat stolidly in front of empty 
plates,” explaining that they ate before they came because they 
had not known if the dinner would be vegan (61). On Callicott’s 
account they were failing to recognize an obligation to accept 
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the hospitality of their hosts. “Had it not been inappropriate to 
do so, I would like to have insisted that the two elder-insulting 
graduate students take my seminar in ethical theory” (62).
Challenging Meat. Callicott’s conclusion is undermined 
by three anti-meat papers that follow his, each of which 
offers a sustained response to the inefficacy objection. Two 
of these papers are nicely done. Mark Budolfson grounds an 
obligation to avoid meat in a theory that grants weight to the 
degrees of essentiality of harm to an act. Harm or killing are 
“highly essential” to the production of meat, so we have an 
obligation to avoid it, whether or not our individual shopping 
decisions hasten modern agriculture’s demise (96). On an 
empirical level Budolfson notes that our individual shopping 
decisions can impact the finances of individual restaurants 
and supermarkets, surely important elements of the industrial 
food system. Clayton Littlejohn examines responses to ethical 
veganism that all appeal in one way or another to the idea that 
one’s individual actions have no moral significance. One such 
“no-difference” argument Littlejohn examines is the inefficacy 
objection. Among other failings, he argues, it too quickly 
detaches our individual obligations from our collective ones. 
If the food system as a whole is to be reformed, then economic 
consequences of our shopping decisions are not all that matters. 
So does the example we set for others, which can stigmatize 
meat-eating and help form a critical mass of plant-eaters that 
can effect change. Littlejohn’s essay makes sure-footed moves 
through notoriously difficult philosophical terrain, addressing 
foundational questions concerning the nature of death, harm 
and well-being, and contains a good bibliography on the larger 
philosophical debate over the inefficacy objection.
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As nice as Budolfson and Littlejohn’s papers are, the standout 
of their section is Julia Driver’s “Individual Consumption and 
Moral Complicity.” Driver plausibly suggests that the notion 
that we can be complicit in the wrongdoing of others is firmly 
lodged in everyday morality. She explores different ways the 
concept of complicity might be spelt out, including though the 
use of a collective notion of accountability. As she puts it, “if 
one is a part of, a participant in, the cause of the bad outcome, 
then one is accountable. We don’t just evaluate the actions of 
individuals, we also evaluate collective actions, and we can 
evaluate the action of an individual as part of a collective.” (71) 
On this view someone can be accountable for a wrong even if 
her actions play no causal role in bringing it about. Driver gives 
the example of a group of people hiding a body. One of them 
is physically weak, so that when they all push the corpse into a 
river, her effort contributes nothing. Our notion of complicity 
should be wide enough to admit that we can be judged for the 
wrongs we commit with others, independent of the difference 
we make on an individual level. 
Driver further presses the case against the inefficacy 
objection by noting that it is inconsistent with a rule or policy-
based approach to ethics. “Even if it is true that a single act on 
a single occasion has no causal impact . . . a policy surely does. 
The policy itself introduces another reason for a person to act. 
Thus, that the policy is a good policy gives me a reason to act 
according to the policy.” (74) This is significant insofar as the 
inefficacy objection is sometimes framed in consequentialist 
terms. Driver shows that rejecting the objection is consistent 
with rule-consequentialism. A proponent of the objection 
might then retreat to act-consequentialism, but this will be 
a big concession. Not only does it confine the relevance of 
the objection to act-consequentialists, the proponent of the 
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objection must now take on the thankless task of defeating 
the many well-known objections to act-consequentialism, 
made famous not only by anti-consequentialists such as 
Bernard Williams and Samuel Scheffler, but the entire rule-
consequentialist tradition.2
If Driver’s discussion of the inefficacy objection is more 
in-depth and probing that Callicott’s, it may reflect their 
different argumentative strategies. Driver gives the inefficacy 
objection sustained treatment throughout her chapter, whereas 
for Callicott it is but one of many subjects (at one point he 
describes his position as a “nuanced Humean-Darwinian-
Leopoldian-Midgelyan biological paradigm of ethics,” the 
awkward label name-checking all the sources his essay draws 
on). As for the anecdote about the graduate students, its 
relevance is unclear. A similar faux pas could be committed by 
a follower of any dietary code, whether it be kosher, gluten-free 
or Callicott’s own prohibition on factory-farmed meat. In each 
case the problem would not be the very fact of having a code, as 
Callicott strangely suggests, but failing to communicate with 
and be sensitive to the feelings of one’s host.
The remaining anti-meat papers are not centrally concerned 
with the inefficacy objection. Ben Bramble discusses it briefly, 
but the novelty of his paper is its speculation that meat-eating 
can be a cause of unconscious psychological costs, insofar as 
it seems to require that we deny any awareness of the moral 
wrongs done to food animals. Tristan McPherson investigates 
whether omnivores can appeal to a variation of G.E. Moore’s 
reply to the skeptic. Moore famously argued that he knew he had 
hands, and insofar as skeptical conclusions were incompatible 
with this belief, so much the worse for skepticism. Similarly, a 
2  Smart and Williams (1973) and Scheffler (1994). 
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Moorean omnivore might say that she knows it is not wrong to 
drink a glass of milk, and insofar as arguments for veganism are 
inconsistent with this belief, so much the worse for veganism. 
McPherson argues that the omnivore’s version of the argument 
is much weaker than Moore’s. Among other reasons, giving up 
the belief that we have hands would require radical revision of 
our epistemic paradigms. The changes required by veganism 
are comparatively mundane. Appealing to the knowledge that 
we have hands thus provides stronger evidentiary support than 
appealing to the permissibility of drinking milk. 
McPherson’s paper is tightly argued and his conclusion that 
Moorean omnivorism has severe problems is convincing. But 
no one appears to have ever made such an argument, and its lack 
of initial plausibility, for all the reasons McPherson catalogues, 
would seem an obvious explanation why. McPherson’s paper 
thus comes across as an intellectual exercise rather than a 
contribution to the ongoing philosophical debate. In this way it 
shares something with Belshaw’s otherwise well-argued paper, 
which does not make a sufficient case for its controversial 
premise that it is permissible to kill entities incapable of desiring 
their own future. This idea and its ramifications for the moral 
standing of infants require just as much argumentative support, 
if not more, than any claim about meat-eating. 
New Directions. Co-authors Lori Gruen and Robert Jones 
compare two different understandings of veganism. “Identity 
veganism” is a way of keeping one’s hands clean of animal 
harm. This view however overlooks that it is currently 
impossible to avoid all harm to animals. In an echo of Bruckner, 
the authors’ leading example is the death of animals in crop 
cultivation. “Aspirational veganism” by contrast embraces 
harm-reduction as an ideal, viewing it as “something that one 
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works at rather than something one is” (156). Gruen and Jones 
see this version of veganism as inseparable from other forms 
of ethical consumerism, such as those devoted to “protesting 
GMOs [genetically modified organisms], spreading the word 
about the devastating impact of palm oil production . . . and 
resist[ing] industrial capitalism” (164).
Gruen and Jones offer an interesting discussion of the culture 
of modern meat eating, which now includes Mobile Slaughter 
Units that travel to small farms to kill animals on site, as well 
as the twelve-week “full immersion” butchery program offered 
by Fleisher’s Craft Butcher in New York (Tuition: $15,000). 
These schemes continue the discretionary killing of animals, 
but add a locavore-hipster sheen. Extended to other issues, this 
approach would address drone strikes by having the pilots wear 
skinny jeans, or help minimum-wage workers by ensuring 
indie rock was streaming in their workplace. 
Gruen and Jones are surely correct about the drawbacks of 
identity veganism. Yet the fact that they do not cite anyone who 
defends this self-flattering view makes it seem a straw doll. 
They could also say more to defend their oddly exclusionary 
view of veganism. I’ve always seen veganism as a rough ethical 
equivalent of an overlapping consensus: a practice that people 
with many divergent political, religious and philosophical 
views can adopt. This view seems more appealing because it 
has a more inclusive conception of who can be vegan, while still 
allowing debates of issues beyond animal products to continue 
unabated. As for the issues Gruen and Jones mention, after 
Moral Complexities went to press, 107 Nobel laureates signed 
a letter characterizing Greenpeace’s opposition to GMOs as 
scientifically misinformed.3 Gruen and Jones’ assumption 
3 Achenbach (2016). 
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without argument that GMOs should be opposed leaves this 
and other briefs for GMOs untouched. Their discussion of 
the serious problems caused by palm oil plantations would be 
improved by not referring to plantations in “countries such as 
Borneo and Sumatra” (157). Borneo and Sumatra are islands. 
The former is divided between Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, 
while the latter is part of Indonesia. 
Neil Levy offers a fascinating and highly original discussion 
of dietary ethics in “Vegetarianism: Toward Ideological 
Impurity.” Levy recounts a news story about a Hindu woman 
who inadvertently ate a bite of meat on an international flight. 
The woman became extremely upset, believing she had violated 
a sacred requirement. Levy suggests that he and other secular 
vegetarians sometimes experience their own diets in quasi-
sacred terms, insofar as they too would become extremely upset 
at eating even a small amount of meat, viewing it as a purity 
violation. Levy seeks to replace this view of vegetarianism 
(and veganism) with one that is strict but not sacred. 
Levy defends strict dietary codes by citing psychological 
research on how we apply behavioural rules. The research 
suggests that “the extent to which rules must be interpreted 
in order to be applied predicts their liability to encourage self-
deception” (180).4 Telling ourselves that we are only going to 
eat free-range meat requires us to make ongoing judgement 
calls. To take one of Levy’s examples, “should I accept the 
waiter’s assurance that the pig was slaughtered humanely?” 
(180). The science suggests we have a tendency to succumb to 
temptation in answering such questions. A strict no-meat rule 
by contrast does a better job managing weakness of will and 
requires less cognitive labour.
4 See Ainslie (2001).
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As for sacredness, Levy makes a compelling case that it 
can actually undermine a commitment to plant-based eating. 
Sacred thinking tends to be all or nothing: hence the Hindu 
woman’s belief that one mouthful of meat could undo a 
lifetime of vegetarianism. This thinking means that there is 
no difference between falling just short of a dietary ideal and 
rejecting it outright. Applied to the woman on the airplane, if her 
purity really was gone, she might as well have eaten an entire 
cow when she landed. But surely we do want to distinguish 
between not quite living up to a dietary ideal and completely 
abandoning it.
The final two papers, which I cannot do justice to here, are by 
Bob Fischer and Alexandria Plakias. In “Against Blaming the 
Blameworthy,” Fisher makes the thought-provoking claim that 
although eating meat is wrong, the case for actively blaming 
meat eaters is weak. The average person can be blamed for many 
things, from failing to give enough to charity to supporting 
brands that exploit their workers, so we have to decide what 
kind of change-inducing blame to prioritize. That involving 
an immoral diet is low on the list. In “Beetles, Bicycles, and 
Breath Mints: How ‘Omni’ Should Omnivores Be?,” Plakias 
offers a thoughtful discussion of how food is distinguished 
from non-food, a form of line-drawing over which we have 
more autonomy than we generally realize. 
What counts as food returns us to Bruckner’s argument for 
roadkill. When I taught his piece in a class on philosophy and 
the environment several students said it was their favourite 
reading. I can see why, given how original and fearless it is. 
Bruckner’s claim is not that roadkill is permissible, but that 
it is an obligatory staple for vegans. If this is right it will have 
ramifications for practically every vegan. But is it right? As with 
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Callicott, confidence in Bruckner’s argument is undermined by 
other chapters of Moral Complexities.
One reason is suggested by Driver, who asks whether an 
ethical vegan could reasonably eat meat other people had 
already thrown out. We might think so on the familiar grounds 
that such a habit would have no impact on the fate of animals. 
Driver suggests that if meat eating is wrong in general, then 
it is also wrong for the vegan dumpster diver. “A system is 
established whereby some people habitually benefit from the 
misdeeds of others, allowing them to reap the benefits without 
the dirty hands” (76). Extended to roadside animals, if some 
were killed by drivers guilty of negligence (or worse) then 
the same problem of “bypassing norms” will also apply to 
consumers of roadkill (76): they will benefit from, and so be 
complicit in, an immoral practice. 
The case for roadkill is also undermined by the rule-
following problem highlighted by Levy. Whether roadkill was 
served by waiters or sold out of the back of trucks, people who 
acquired it would inevitably have to decide whether or not the 
meat they wanted to eat really was roadkill, risking a demand 
for animals deliberately killed for food. 
Brucker might mitigate these problems by only requiring 
us to eat animals we run over ourselves. This however raises 
a separate problem. The rationale for eating roadkill is that it 
will cause fewer animal deaths than agriculture. In making this 
case Bruckner points out, correctly, that no one really knows 
how many animals are killed in crop cultivation. Nevertheless, 
he is untroubled by the lack of an accurate figure. Even if the 
number of harvester deaths turn out to be small, he figures, it 
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will still be more than the number of deaths caused by eating 
roadkill, which must be zero. 
But would a norm of eating accidentally killed animals really 
not cause any additional deaths? Grounds for doubt came to 
mind when my wife and I had to decide whether to drive or fly 
on a family trip. We weighed the usual pros and cons of money, 
time and screaming kids in the back seat. Bruckner’s scheme 
would add a consideration in favour of driving: we might happen 
to hit some deer along the way. His proposal thus incentivizes 
people to take to the roads in hope of killing animals, thereby 
gaining access to the rare delicacy of their flesh. This suggests 
that we cannot assume zero additional animal deaths after all. 
We rather have two food-production schemes, agricultural and 
agriculture plus roadkill, both causing an unknown number of 
animal fatalities. This is enough to drain Bruckner’s proposal 
of obligatory force.
Yet Bruckner’s proposal remains significant, as it illustrates 
how the animal debate is changing. Critics once attacked, even 
ridiculed, the very idea of animal rights. Bruckner represents 
an increasingly common type of critic who does not challenge 
the central argument for animal justice, but rather tinkers with 
its implications.5 Bruckner’s proposed diet is itself a form of 
veganism, ruling out as it does buying leather or fur and eating 
eggs or milk, let alone the vast majority of meat consumption. 
Where previous critics once challenged veganism outright, 
those of Bruckner’s modern stripe want in on the debate over 
the precise form it should take. This may not be everything 
vegans hope for, but it is progress beyond doubt.
5  For other examples see Davis (2003) and Archer (2011). 
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